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19 March 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Governor Dewey's Comments on CIA in the Presidential Primary in 1948

1. In the early part of 1948, Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York was campaigning extensively for the Republican nomination for the Presidency. Admiral Hillenkoetter, then DCI, was concerned about certain highly critical remarks about CIA which the Governor was making publicly. The Admiral was anxious to keep CIA out of politics and particularly out of the campaign. I told Admiral Hillenkoetter that I was well acquainted with a New York lawyer named [REDACTED] who was a long-time friend and political associate of Governor Dewey. They had been in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York together and their close association continued after Mr. [REDACTED] went into private practice and the Governor into politics. Actually, [REDACTED] was one of the few people who could get through to Governor Dewey on the telephone at almost any time, a difficult feat as Mr. Dewey tended to deal through his executive secretary or others rather than take calls himself.

2. On 24 March 1948, The New York Times in headlines noted that the "Governor Also Would Rebuild Intelligence Arm" and reported Dewey's press conference in Albany of the previous day. Dewey outlined his program for dealing with the international situation at that press conference and stated as his second point "Our intelligence services that were built up during the war were destroyed by a stroke of the President's pen a year ago and should be rebuilt."

3. After consultation with the Director, I wrote [REDACTED] a letter, dated 24 March 1948, copy attached. In it I expressed surprise at the Governor's statement as he did not seem to be aware of the existence of CIA, some wonderment as to what it referred, and sent some explanatory material. I also noted that I had been informed that Governor Dewey had previously discussed certain aspects of CIA with Congressman James Wadsworth (R., N.Y.), who had been a member of the House Committee which handled the National Security Act of 1947 in which CIA was established, and expressed the opinion that certainly Governor Dewey's friend, Allen Dulles, who was a close campaign adviser to the Governor, must have also discussed it with him. There is no reply to this letter in my file, perhaps because it got overtaken by subsequent events.

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4. On 1 April 1948, Governor Dewey returned to the attack in a speech at Milwaukee in which he said "We should create immediately a competent, world-wide intelligence service." (Extract attached) In this speech Dewey took note of the President's Executive Letter of 22 January 1946 in which the President "by a stroke of his pen ... created a new, untried and inexperienced group." He interpreted the Truman action as cutting off the FBI's "fine services" and "closed down" on Army and Navy Intelligence. The Governor continued "This incredible Administration of ours [the Truman Administration] has put out our eyes and cut off our ears. Real intelligence services, under competent direction, that will alert free government to its dangers and its opportunities should be re-established and re-established immediately." STATOTHR

5. On 3 April I spoke to [redacted] on the telephone regarding Dewey's Milwaukee remarks, indicating that they had no foundation in present fact and suggesting that the Governor be advised of this. [redacted] suggested that the approach to Mr. Dewey be made through those on whom he would normally rely for such information. The names of Mr. Allen Dulles and Representative Wadsworth were mutually agreed upon, in preference to a direct visit from someone from CIA. On April 5 I attempted to reach Congressman Wadsworth but he was unavailable and I spoke to his assistant, Mr. Eiker. I indicated CIA's concern in the matter of Governor Dewey's comments on intelligence in Milwaukee, with the additional thought that intelligence should not be the subject of political debate nor should one in the Governor's position be so ill informed or badly advised. I then called [redacted] to tell him of my conversation which he promised to transmit to Governor Dewey. STATOTHR

6. Later, on 5 April, [redacted] called me back to say that he had passed our message on to Albany and that they were greatly concerned about it. Albany agreed that, as a court of last resort, they would accept any statement which Mr. Allen Dulles cared to make on the subject to the Governor. It was further requested that we talk to Mr. Dulles to ascertain whether he would be willing to make a statement on our behalf in this connection. I referred this to Admiral Hillenkoetter for action but am unaware of what steps he may have taken in the matter. STATOTHR

7. On 9 April, the famous Bogotazo incident broke loose in Colombia accompanied by congressional charges that CIA had failed to give adequate warning. Governor Dewey joined the attack in a special

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broadcast from Albany to Republican voters in Nebraska stating that if we had an adequate intelligence service we would have known about Communist plans at Bogota. He also pointed out that our intelligence work should be the most secret information in the government, yet "left-wing newspapers in Paris actually printed the name of the new head of the service before he knew it himself and six weeks before it was announced to the American press." [This is a separate incident which was easily explainable as noted in the attached letter to Mr. ██████████ dated 6 May 1948.]

8. While the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments and its members gave CIA a clean bill of health on the Bogotazo, and even some of the members of the press came to our defense in mid-April, Governor Dewey attacked once more in a speech at Eugene, Oregon on 5 May. There he called for the creation of a first-rate intelligence service and cited the Bogota incident as a "pitiful failure." On 6 May, I wrote ██████████ again citing the congressional and press statements. He sent me a one sentence reply which read: "I have your letter but I am afraid my hands are tied."

9. While I have not checked the record, I believe that STATINTL Governor Dewey did not seriously attack us again during the campaign.

Walter Pforzheimer
Curator
Historical Intelligence Collection

Attachments

1. Letter to [REDACTED]
dated 24 March 1948
 2. Extract from speech by
Gov. Dewey at Milwaukee
on 1 April 1948
 3. Letter to [REDACTED]
dated 6 May 1948

Washington, D.C.
24 March 1948

OTHR

[Redacted]

I have been meaning to write you for the past few days to tell you that some of the newspaper men close to the Republican National Committee down here are now feeling that the Honorable the Governor of the State of New York has the nomination sewed up. While the rumors pro and con are bound to fly until the last ballot is counted, I pass it on as an antidote to those who think that Dewey and Taft will deadlock and that Vandenberg will fall heir. My personal thought is that Dewey's Boston speech was masterful, and of all those in the field today his vast administrative experience should be a determining factor.

One of the reasons I am writing you is to express a little surprise at a Dewey quotation in this morning's paper, as follows: "Our intelligence services that were built up during the war were destroyed by a stroke of the President's pen a year ago, and should be rebuilt." I cannot imagine to what he refers. If it is the President's Executive Order of 22 January 1946, which established the Central Intelligence Group, it should be pointed out that this Executive Order is no longer in effect, the Group having been superseded by the Central Intelligence Agency, which was created by Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947. I am enclosing a copy of this Act for your information. I am also sending along a copy of a statement by General Hoyt S. Vandenberg before the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, which he made in support of our Section of the bill when he was the Director of Central Intelligence. (He is now the Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, having been succeeded at the Central Intelligence Agency by Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter.)

So, you see, there really is a going concern which coordinates all of the foreign intelligence activities of the United States, based on strong legislative authority. In addition, at the present time we have a bill before the Congress -- a copy of which is enclosed -- which I drafted, and which will give us certain legislative authority to carry out the peculiar administrative needs of an intelligence service.

I am writing to you at this length because it was so surprising to me that the Governor should not seem to realize the

existence of the Central Intelligence Agency. I thought he was well aware of it, because I was informed that he discussed certain aspects of it with Representative Wadsworth last spring. Certainly his old friend Allen Dulles must have discussed it with him.

I hope you will consider this letter very personal, and any use you make of it would be preferably without the use of my name.

I wonder if you ever do get to Washington, because it STATINTL doesn't look as if I will get to New York before the end of the Congressional session. Just in case you do, and in case you have time to say "hello."

[REDACTED]

With very best wishes to everyone, I am

Sincerely yours,

Walter L. Pforzheimer

Excerpt of speech by Gov. Thomas E. Dewey at Milwaukee on 1 April 1948.

We should create immediately a competent, world-wide intelligence service. During the last war, for the first time in our history, we had many brave men planted in dangerous places all over the world. We really knew at the end of the war what was going on in the world. But the President by a stroke of his pen on Jan. 22, 1946, created a new, untried and inexperienced group. Our established services were later abolished. He cut off the fine services J. Edgar Hoover and the F. B. I. had established. He closed down on Army Intelligence and Navy Intelligence. This incredible Administration of ours has put out our eyes and cut off our ears. Real intelligence services, under competent direction, that will alert free government to its dangers and its opportunities should be re-established and re-established immediately.

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE
2 April 1948.

5. Rebuild the nation's war-time intelligence network, which was sharply reduced two years ago by Executive Order. Scoring President Truman's "incredible administration" for the curtailment, Mr. Dewey said "real intelligence services" would "alert free government to its dangers and opportunities."

Box 510
Washington, D.C.
6 May 1948

TO: THR

[REDACTED]

After the lull of the last few weeks, I had thought that Governor Dewey was laying off the intelligence picture, but this morning's paper seems to indicate that he is at it again. The New York Herald-Tribune quotes him as stating that the recent Bogota uprising was a demonstration of "the pitiful failure of our intelligence service." Just to keep the record straight between us, I thought I might set down a few points for your personal interest in this connection. These remarks were a continuation of the Governor's broadcast to Nebraska of 12 April, in which he pointed out that had we had adequate intelligence service we would have known about the Bogota outbreak. As a result of such charges, a Congressional subcommittee, headed by Rep. Clarence Brown of Ohio, and including Rep. Clare Hoffman of Michigan and John McCormack of Massachusetts, met in Executive Session with the Director of Central Intelligence and myself, and reviewed the whole intelligence picture with regard to Bogota. You have doubtless seen the newspaper stories subsequent to the Director's appearance, which indicated that Central Intelligence Agency did know of the probabilities of trouble in Bogota and had so informed the State Department. However, the following quotation from Clarence Brown's statement after the hearings may be of interest. He stated, "Our Central Intelligence Agency obviously was in close touch with Communist operations, not only in Colombia but in several other countries of South and Central America. In all but one instance, the U. S. Intelligence reports from Bogota were transmitted promptly to the State Department."

The Wilmington, Delaware News-Journal pointed out editorially on 16 April, "The fear that the United States Intelligence Service had fallen down on the job was effectively, and happily, dissipated yesterday in the testimony given a House subcommittee by Admiral Hillenkoetter, chief of the Central Intelligence Agency. . . . Anyway, all Americans will be glad to learn that the nation's intelligence service was fully on the alert."

Congressman Clare Hoffman, Chairman of the House Committee on Expenditures and a member of the committee which

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investigated the Bogota incident had this to state on 17 April in a formal release -- "Our Central Intelligence Agency had agents on the ground in Bogota. It performed its duty. It learned what was happening days before the rioting and bloodshed in Bogota."

The Washington Post, which had been somewhat critical editorially on 13 April questioning whether we had been caught napping, stated editorially on 17 April that, "The questions we raised last Monday -- whether the intelligence agency had been caught napping in Bogota or whether it had been ignored -- are now answered. Admiral Hillenkoetter has acquitted the Central Intelligence Agency of ignorance of Communist plans to scuttle the Inter-American Conference. Evidently the State Department was at fault in cold-shouldering the warnings and in at least one case in preventing their dispatch to Washington."

Newsweek on 26 April 1948, in talking of this investigation, stated, "Examining Hillenkoetter's documents, the subcommittee was impressed by the CIA's efficiency."

I have gone to this seeming length with you so that it may not appear that my remarks are merely self-serving declarations on behalf of the Agency, but are rather the general consensus of opinion. It remains a continual source of amazement to me that the Governor should continue his attacks. It can only mean that he is being very ill advised in this matter.

They are the same attacks which were hurled at us prior to the passage of the Unification Act in the spring of 1947. For instance, in his final Nebraska broadcast, the New York Times on 13 April 1948 quotes the Governor as stating that, "The work of our intelligence unit should be the most secret thing in our Government. And yet, left-wing newspapers in Paris actually printed the name of the new head of the service before he knew it himself and six weeks before it was announced to the American press." The story of the particular article in the Paris newspaper France-Soir was read into the Congressional hearings last spring by Congressman Busbey of Illinois and questions were raised also by Senator Bridges. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, who was then our Director, sent them a letter pointing out that much of the information contained in the French article was inaccurate and that much of it could be obtained from the President's Executive Order of 22 January 1946 which was a public document. Senator Bridges raised some questions with the Director in connection with this article at the hearing last spring and upon the Director's answers expressed himself as quite satisfied, and subsequently

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voted for his confirmation as Director. It was pointed out that the Admiral was transferred from the Office of Naval Attaché in Paris to the Office of the Secretary of the Navy for duty as Director of Central Intelligence on orders which were unrestricted. There is no secret as to whom the Director is, and these orders were brought to the attention of the French Naval Attaché in Washington who cabled Paris in order that the French might have an opportunity to congratulate the Admiral in his new assignment.

I shall not bore you with further details about this Paris article on which the Governor relied, other than that it states that, "Admiral Hillenkoetter shall be directly responsible to the President only," when in effect he was responsible to the National Intelligence Authority. The article further stated that the Admiral "shall be responsible for the security of the United States in case of sudden attack by arms or atomic means," the obvious inaccuracies of which are clear.

As I said above, I do not want to burden you with these details other than to indicate to you the inaccuracy of the information the Governor appears to be receiving on this subject. Furthermore, I want to be able to back up for you any assertions that I make to you as a matter of our personal friendship. I hope you do not mind my having gone on at this great length.

My best regards to you and all of the boys, particularly those two rapidly aging and decaying individuals, Herbert and Everett.

Sincerely yours,

Walter L. Pforzheimer

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

76-2209

Ex copy

Curly J

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Mr. Chamberlain		
2			
3			
4			
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6			

ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS	DATE
SAC/DCI - [REDACTED]	12 May 76
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET	

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ROUTING SHEET BY [Signature]

Release 2001/11/20 : CIA-RDP79M00467A0003

connection with the attached memo;

recalled 4 boxes of Admiral Hillenkoetter's
files from R cords Center - for [REDACTED]
review.

Box # 1 and Box # 2 of JOB 56-301

Box # 1 of JOB 59-718

Box # of JOB 59-779

[REDACTED] reviewd them and returned
to ER on 5/14/76; - ER returned them to
record Center on 5/17/76

[REDACTED]